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A R T I C L E
RÉSUMÉ ¤ De plus en plus, les techniques de dépistage génétique quittent les laboratoires de recherche pour faire leur entrée sur le
marché. Pourtant, très peu de bourses sont consacrées à la recherche sur les conséquences du dépistage génétique privé sur un système
public de soins de santé comme celui du Canada. Il est crucial de déterminer si, et comment, ces tests devraient être offerts au public et si
les individus auraient à débourser pour bénéficier de ces services, et en quelle proportion. De plus, il est impératif d’évaluer  jusqu’à quel
point les tests génétiques sont, ou devraient être, inclus dans le système de soins de santé, et l’impact qu’aurait un système à deux régimes.
C’est en tenant compte de ce contexte difficile que nous avons proposé cette série de seuils de validité qui visent à déterminer si, d’un point
de vue moral, un test génétique se justifie, s’il est efficace et sans danger, s’il est rentable et opportun de le financer avec les fonds publics et
si son accès dans le domaine privé pose des problèmes particuliers et nécessite une réglementation approfondie. Ces seuils de validité
permettent aussi d’identifier les questions autour desquelles les débats professionnel, public et moral doivent être orchestrés : Qu’est-ce
qu’un objectif moralement acceptable en ce qui a trait aux services génétiques? Quels sont les bienfaits appropriés? Quels sont les risques?
Dans quelles circonstances est-il acceptable qu’un service ne soit pas couvert par l’assurance-maladie? Finalement, comment est-il possible
de gérer les effets négatifs qu’entraîne l’accès privé au dépistage génétique? (Traduction : www.isuma.net)
ABSTRACT ¤ Genetic testing technologies are rapidly moving from the research laboratory to the market place. Very little scholarship
considers the implications of private genetic testing for a public health care system such as Canada’s. It is critical to consider how and if
these tests should be marketed to, and purchased by, the public. It is also imperative to evaluate the extent to which genetic tests are or
should be included in Canada’s public health care system, and the impact of allowing a two-tiered system for genetic testing. A series of
threshold tests are presented as ways of clarifying whether a genetic test is morally appropriate, effective and safe, efficient and appropriate
for public funding and whether private purchase poses special problems and requires further regulation. These thresholds also identify the
research questions around which professional, public and policy debate must be sustained: What is a morally acceptable goal for genetic
services? What are the appropriate benefits? What are the risks? When is it acceptable that services are not funded under health care? And
how can the harms of private access be managed? 
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providing genetic testing through the private sector: a view from canada
The practice of medicine willbe revolutionized by a vastarray of new genetic testing
technologies as they become available
to the public, through health care
providers or privately.1 Testing will
provide prospective parents with more
information about their own genetic
makeup (carrier testing) as well as
about their potential or developing
child (preimplantation or prenatal test-
ing). People may be able simultane-
ously to learn about their individual
risk for a host of conditions or illness-
es (predictive and pre-symptomatic
testing), and thus be given the oppor-
tunity or responsibility to change cer-
tain lifestyle behaviours to reduce risk,
make career planning decisions, or
take prophylactic measures (e.g.,
surgery). Testing of people who have
already developed a disease may also
allow for the development of individ-
ualized therapies and pharmaceuticals
(pharmacogenomics) that more accu-
not, but for the “genohype,” be inter-
ested in testing.5 These are some of the
reasons that some policy groups, such
as the u.s. Task Force on Genetic
Testing, have concluded that “adver-
tising or marketing of predictive genet-
ic tests to the public” should be dis-
couraged.6 It has also been argued that
physicians, health professionals and
institutional attitudes and practices
may stimulate the premature or inap-
propriate use of genetic tests by inflat-
ing public interest.7
In the context of a publicly funded
system like Canada’s, any use of
resources for genetic testing may mean
fewer resources for other health needs.
Even if privately financed, genetic test-
ing will have an impact on the public
sector. For example, after receiving the
test results, concerned patients may
flow back to the public sector for advice
and treatment or make lifestyle choices
that over the long run may impose fur-
ther costs on the public system.
provincial governments have formal
mechanisms to monitor the marketing
of genetic services. Yet there are good
economic and social policy arguments
for avoiding—or, at least, tightly reg-
ulating—a private market in any type
of health care service that is judged to
be necessary.12 Primarily, health care
services are not commodities that are
subject to the usual actions of the mar-
ket (i.e., competitiveness and con-
sumer ability to assess). Moreover, the
existence of a private market reduces
the economic efficiency of the public
system because, for example, private
companies profit from these overhead
services (e.g., access to trained research
staff) without contributing to their
funding and development. Finally,
there is some controversy whether the
nafta regulations will require that
once a private market is opened, it
cannot subsequently be regulated in
any way that might results in impedi-
ments to American trade.13
Testing services may be offered to an 
inappropriately broad population before
the benefit has not been established.
Commentators have raised concerns
about the potential for inappropriate
counselling and consent processes,8 a
lack of effective confidentiality guide-
lines within the private sphere,9 and
the need for ensuring quality control.10
It has also been noted that many health
care providers, such as family physi-
cians, know little about genetic testing,
a lack of professional knowledge that
is worrisome.11 However, until the
research necessary to establish appro-
priate testing guidelines is conducted,
health care providers cannot be expect-
ed to know how, when or for whom a
particular genetic test is appropriate.
Regulatory challenges
Currently no Canadian jurisdiction
has regulations to address the infor-
mation and economic concerns related
to the adoption of genetic tests in the
public health care system or private
market. Neither the federal nor
There are, nevertheless, examples of
private markets for health care ser-
vices that are not or only partially cov-
ered under Canada’s provincial health
insurance schemes (e.g., pharmaceuti-
cals, some cosmetic surgery, fertility
treatments, corrective eye surgery,
alternative or complementary medi-
cines). It is beyond the scope of this
paper to determine whether such
treatments should, in fact, receive pub-
lic funding, or how nafta require-
ments affect these and other health
care services. Since these examples
already exist, a specific regulation of
private genetic tests should be based
on explicit justification. In addition,
given the current disarray of regulato-
ry mechanisms, a novel regulatory
framework may be required in imple-
ment a prohibition or regulatory pol-
icy effectively.
A number of factors may make it
difficult for any one jurisdiction
rately target treatments and reduce
unwanted side-effects.2
While these advances undoubtedly
hold much promise, concerns have
been raised in relation to the provision
of commercial testing services. For
example, it has been argued that com-
mercial pressure may cause testing ser-
vices to be offered prematurely, in cir-
cumstances in which the benefit has
not been established, or to an inap-
propriately broad population. More-
over, for the purposes of marketing,
the uncertainties associated with pri-
vate testing may be minimized.3 It has
been speculated that this market pres-
sure may further “geneticize” society’s
view of disease and disability, as well
as of normal variation, such as athlet-
ic ability, intelligence or criminal
behaviour.4 There is also concern that
industry—and researcher—generat-
ed interest in testing may cause unnec-
essary anxiety in individuals who may
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(provincial or federal) to address the
noted policy issues. These factors
include the promotion of biotechnolo-
gy by industry, universities, researchers,
government,14 health care profession-
als and institutions;15 the global nature
of the genetic revolution and the
potential for “cross-border shop-
ping;”16 and the possible regulatory
implications of monopoly control
resulting from a patent on a genetic
sequence.17 A variety of the technolog-
ical advances still on the horizon have
the potential to alter both the scope
and nature of the policy issues in this
area. For example, multiplex tests that
use emerging genomic technology such
as dna chips to test hundreds or thou-
sands of genes for a number of diseases
simultaneously, may create unique
consent and patent law issues while, at
the same time, make genetic testing
seem more routine.18
Finally, the nature of Canada’s
health care system needs to be consid-
ered. As will be discussed more fully
below, there are no clear criteria for
determining what services will receive
full or partial public funding and what
services will be left totally to private
financing. Compounding this ambigu-
ity over regulatory and funding policy
are the federal-provincial tensions over
the legal jurisdiction to govern in the
area of health care and the legislative
framework delineating the public sys-
tem’s funding obligations (e.g., the
Canada Health Act refers to the fund-
ing of “medically necessary” physician
and hospital services but gives
provinces considerable latitude to
define the scope, level and nature of
service coverage). In short, the reality
is that there is uncertainty and poor
justification for what services are or
are not partially or fully insured, and
for the level of funding.
There is no doubt that the complex
context in which genetic testing is
emerging creates unique challenges to
the development of effective policies.
These difficulties, however, should not
be an excuse for inaction on the part
of governments. Instead, the regulato-
ry challenges should be a spur to solve
these problems, not only to ensure the
health and well-being of Canadians
and their treasured social health care
system, but also for the long-term
health of genetic testing industries.
This paper is meant to serve as a step
toward identifying the pieces to the
puzzle that Canadian policy makers
must solve.
Analytic framework
The following analysis is organized
around a modified version of Deber et.
al.’s proposal for determining what
services deserve public funding.19
Their staged analysis illustrates a clear
analytic framework for assessing some
of the issues, as well as for structuring
arguments for or against public fund-
ing. The following analysis proposes
four thresholds that deal with whether
anyone should receive a service, and
two final thresholds that consider
whether this service should be fully or
partially financed with public money
or be available for patient-paid pur-
chase. We recognize that the logical
ordering does not always correspond
to the chronology of how knowledge
and technology are developed so some
of the analysis for a specific test will
necessarily be retrospective (e.g.,
moral concerns may be raised after the
use of a test identifies harms). 
Threshold 1: 
Is the test morally acceptable?
Some tests or interventions may be
found objectionable because their
goals or consequences are viewed as
simply unacceptable. At any point in
the development of a genetic test, a
society may decide that a test should
not be made available and/or that cer-
tain procedures should be required if a
test were conducted. For example, in
Canada, the 1993 Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies
recommended, and the federal gov-
ernment concurred in Bill c-47, that
sex selection should be prohibited.20
Similarly, in some countries “non-
medical” uses of genetic tests are pro-
hibited; a number of European coun-
tries have enacted prohibitions on a
variety of reproductive and genetic
technologies.21
In practice, the adverse implications
of such prohibitions should also be
considered in policy development. For
example, they may have an unintend-
ed impact on potentially useful
research, and economic development
opportunities may be lost.22 This is not
a simple trade-off of health benefits for
economic loss, since wealth, health
and welfare are recognized to be inex-
tricably bound together at the level of
both individuals and populations. 
Because this threshold reflects val-
ues, it evokes questions of how, and
by whom, these values will be
expressed. In this context it is worth
noting that there is a growing body of
literature that critiques the manner in
which economic, technology and pub-
lic policies are developed and influ-
enced by industry and intellectual
elites. For example, the tendency to
value public input only if it is “edu-
cated” with respect to technical
aspects of an issue such as genetic test-
ing has been criticized as a “deficit
model” of public participation.23 It is
particularly important in areas of
moral ambiguity and vested interests
that improved public participation
mechanisms be developed. Danish
public consensus conferences and sci-
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ence shops in the Netherlands, Austria
and Germany provide some examples
of innovative approaches to involving
the public in policy development.24
In any event, an outright prohibition
of genetic testing or certain genetic
tests may not be completely effective
as some people may still order tests
from other jurisdictions. Nonetheless,
a government regulation prohibiting
specific tests stands as a statement of
national values and may feed into
what preferences consumers have with
regard to the private purchase of test-
ing. It may also reduce the visibility of
such tests, and exposure of the gener-
al public to advertising for these tests,
thus helping to reduce the “genohype”
pressure.
Threshold 2: 
Does the test actually identify a
genetic factor?
No test should be offered without
passing some minimum standard of
techniques, etc.26 For example, in
British Columbia, this service is under-
taken by the Diagnostic Accreditation
Program (dap),27 which is jointly
funded and administered by the B.C.
Medical Association and the B.C. Col-
lege of Physicians and Surgeons. In
Ontario, accreditation is assumed by
the Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Program (lptp),28 which is also
involved in laboratory licensing.
British Columbia does not yet have
laboratory licensing. The federal gov-
ernment, through the Health Protec-
tion Branch (hpb) and its Therapeutic
Products Program (tpp), monitors the
development and marketing of genet-
ic test kits (e.g., for cystic fibrosis or
paternity). However, the majority of
genetic tests are offered as in-house
laboratory services and, as such, their
validity and quality are not formally
evaluated;29 this situation is similar to
that in the United States where the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement
use of a given test, it may be more dif-
ficult for a Canadian regulatory body
to address issues of quality control. 
Threshold 3: Is the test useful?
Once it has been determined that a test
can actually identify a given mutation,
the usefulness of the information it
provides must be evaluated. In other
words, is there an established and well-
understood association between the
genetic variation and a given pheno-
type for a given population? For exam-
ple, the brca1/2 test more dependably
predicts disease frequency in the
Ashkenazi Jewish populations than for
the general population. Though the
test is also available for people with a
significant family history, its usefulness
in some populations is still being
debated.33 Assessment of usefulness
must weigh benefits against possible
harms. Benefits of genetics tests may
include directing treatment, avoiding
unnecessary harms caused by more fre-
In the context of a publicly funded system, any use
of resources for genetic testing may mean fewer 
resources for other health needs.
efficacy. Currently, there is no formal,
generally accepted, standard for deter-
mining threshold validity in this con-
text. But as we contemplate policy, it
seems axiomatic that a test must at
least detect what it claims to detect.
Such a threshold criterion would
ensure that tests that have no efficacy
are not marketed or sold to health
care professionals and patients (i.e.,
genetic tests might be held to a stan-
dard of proof similar to that in the
pharmaceutical industry). Thus, for
example, a test should reliably identi-
fy the specific genetic variation(s) in
question, both in the laboratory and
in the marketplace.25
Neither the federal nor provincial
governments have specific policies or
regulatory mechanisms to deal with
this criterion. Laboratories are gener-
ally regulated via provincial accredi-
tation schemes to ensure sufficient
staff training, quality of laboratory
Amendments (clia) regulate labora-
tories and the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (fda) controls test kits, but
there is currently no oversight of lab-
oratory-based genetic tests.30
A regulatory hole exists which
could and must be filled by existing
federal or provincial structures. For
example, in the United States, it has
been recommended that the fda pick
up this quality control responsibility.31
Part of a complete regulatory scheme
would also involve oversight of per-
sonnel and laboratories—indeed, reg-
ulation of laboratory quality has been
identified as a critical issue for this
emerging industry.32 However, the fact
that patent law permits the establish-
ment of single source providers, often
with a laboratory in another country,
may undermine the ability for any one
jurisdiction to comprehensively regu-
late quality. For example, if one U.S.
company has monopoly control of the
quent screening (e.g., mammography,
colonoscopy), possible preventative
strategies for asymptomatic individu-
als (e.g., prophylactic surgery), anxiety
reduction, and even the provision of
information that individuals may use
for personal and/or reproductive plan-
ning. The emphasis on promoting
autonomy in medical genetics and
counselling is often cited to support the
provision of any accurate information
about genetic risk that can be provid-
ed without undue risk or cost.34
Threshold 4: Is the test harmful?
Harms are also complex and may be
justified by benefits. Some people will
experience as harmful the knowledge
of genetic risk in the absence of clear
preventative or therapeutic strategies.
Commentators have identified harms
caused to the individual by the test
and to his/her response to the test
results (e.g., anxiety and depression,
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suicide and inappropriate lifestyle
changes or seeking prophylactic
surgery).35 There are also identified
harms caused by the responses of third
parties and social systems to genetic
testing (e.g., stigmatization, insurance
and employment discrimination, and
altered family relations).36 It could be
argued that the broad social concern
(e.g., geneticization) weighed against
individual benefits should also be con-
sidered at this level.
Some of the harms identified above
might be eliminated or reduced, at
least for some genetic tests, through
regulatory initiatives. Tests that have
passed the thresholds to this point may
vary in the amount of regulation to
which they should be subject. For
example, some tests may warrant cat-
egorical prohibition through profes-
sional self-regulation or, in the
extreme, direct regulation to avoid
misuse (e.g., testing of young children
for an untreatable, late adult onset dis-
order or for “adoptability”). Some
regulatory mechanisms are generally
relevant to patients and health care
providers who may seek genetic test-
ing, i.e., public education, gatekeep-
ing, and support for gatekeepers
through education and regulation.
Given the amount of information
available, and given the various
sources of information (e.g., the Inter-
net37), a crucial regulatory response
will be to improve the quality and
accessibility of information that con-
sumers receive about the harms, bene-
fits and quality of genetic testing (e.g.,
through the Internet, public education,
in physicians’ offices, etc.). Further,
since it is essential that accurate infor-
mation is provided to both the public
and test providers (i.e., physicians,
counsellors), it seems reasonable to
regulate the marketing and advertising
of genetic services to require truth in
advertising, so that scientific claims are
substantiated and the wording of
information (benefits, harms, etc.) pro-
vided to consumers is monitored.38
Such regulation would be not unlike
current demands placed on the phar-
maceutical industry, which ensure that
detailed, accurate product information
is available for all medications. Thresh-
olds one to four presume that a gover-
nance mechanism similar to drug and
device regulatory agencies is required. 
Threshold 5: Should the 
test be publicly funded?
The tests that have passed the previ-
ous thresholds must next be evaluat-
ed as to whether they merit public
financing. Public funding will of
course increase utilization and may
facilitate private profit through the
purchase of licences or provision of
services by private laboratories. Con-
siderations at this level include cost
minimization (is this the least expen-
sive option?), but the key ethical issue
is whether it is acceptable that people
who want and can benefit from test-
ing (but who cannot afford it) are
denied access. Ideally, tests that pro-
vide genuine net health benefit at rea-
sonable cost should be included in the
public health insurance system. This is
in keeping with the spirit, as reflected
in health care legislation, of that amor-
phous concept of “medical necessity.”
Equal access to effective health care
independent of economic status is a
central tenet of public health insurance
schemes worldwide. Ethical justifica-
tion for this claim has been based on
equal opportunity, as well as econom-
ic efficiency. These ethical arguments
and assumptions would support pub-
lic funding of any test that passes the
thresholds to this point, provided it is
the least expensive option to achieve
the health benefit.
Unfortunately, whether particular
services are included in public health
insurance is not the result of a ratio-
nal assessment.39 Rather, health care
budgets are restricted without consid-
eration of what services should be cov-
ered. Some services are insured
because they are historically associat-
ed with professional or institutional
practices. Some services are insured
without adequate demonstration of
benefit and some that are beneficial are
not universally insured (e.g., pharma-
ceuticals, wheelchairs). Pressure for
public financing comes from a variety
of sources including the media, interest
groups, liability concerns, marketing
pressure, researcher interest and clini-
cian enthusiasm. Levels of funding and
waiting lists are also influenced by
these factors. Inevitably and regret-
tably, decisions about genetic testing
will be made in this ad hoc decision-
making environment.
The general issue of rationalized
provision of health services is unlikely
to be resolved in the near future, but
evaluating the issue of public insurance
coverage and private availability of
genetic testing services in an internally
consistent and justified manner might
be exemplary for health care insurance
in general. As such, after determining
that a genetic test is ethical, useful and
relatively safe, consideration needs to
be given to the worth of the service rel-
ative to other health care goods. For
example, it may be determined by
provincial ministries of health that oth-
er health care needs constitute more
urgent demands for limited public
health care funds.
Public and provider consultation,
and an evaluation of the wider social
and structural impacts of providing
these services will also be an essential
but not sufficient component in the
determination of the relative value of
funding genetic tests. Since specific
tests will engage provider and public
groups most affected by the specific
tests, consultations about relative
worth will need to be more general,
aimed at assessing the relative merit of
An outright prohibition on genetic testing or certain
genetic tests may not be completely effective as some 
people may still order tests from other jurisdictions.
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Some tests may warrant categorical 
prohibition through professional 
self-regulation or, in the extreme, 
direct regulation. 
being able to predict or assess risk of
illness, and whether the value of the
test is dependent on the ability to alter
risk or onset. Even this level of under-
standing of the value that providers
and the public give to genetic tests
should assist assessments of relative
worth and whether specific tests
should be insured.
Threshold five encompasses the
range of issues related to whether pub-
lic funds should be spent to sup-
port access to the kind of bene-
fits provided by specific
genetic tests. Tests that have
passed the first four thresh-
olds but not the fifth will
require re-evaluation as
understanding about their
accuracy or benefits in
particular populations
develop. Nonetheless, in
the current ad hoc policy
environment, some genetic
tests at this stage will be
rejected for public funding
not because of lack of
accuracy or benefits, but
because health care fund-
ing is inadequate to fund all
cost-worthy services. In this
sense, threshold five is different from
the first four thresholds as tests that
fail to be publicly funded need to be
evaluated in relation to private pur-
chase. 
Threshold 6: Should the test 
be available for purchase 
with private funds?
Threshold six is an attempt to identi-
fy the issues related to private access
to tests that are accurate and benefi-
cial but not publicly funded, to con-
sider the possible regulatory respons-
es to reducing the risks, and to suggest
what effects of private testing should
be studied. On the assumption that
there are genetic tests that will meet
the considerations of the thresholds
up to but not including support under
public health care insurance, some
useful and safe genetic tests may be
available only through private
arrangements. It is also probable that
some publicly funded tests will be
under-funded, with the effect that a
lengthy waiting list will establish a
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further market for genetic tests that
are covered under public health insur-
ance, or some people may prefer pri-
vate purchase to facilitate privacy or
other values.
There are significant economic and
ethical problems associated with the
co-existence of public and private
genetic testing. Privately purchased
tests and the related profits are pub-
licly subsidized through education,
research and supportive services.40
The quality of the publicly funded sys-
tem may not be maintained if
resources, such as health profession-
als, are pulled toward the privately
funded system. Indeed, there are
strong reasons to believe that private
testing may actually lengthen the
waiting lists in the public system for
those who do not pay for more rapid
access by, for example, reducing pres-
sure to increase access in the public
system. The ideal solution is more
adequate health care funding of the
public system and more rigorous eval-
uation of services for inclusion with
better control over the private market.
It is, however, unlikely that there will
be significantly increased health care
funding or a rationalized system of
controlling supply and access to pri-
vate health care services in the near
future. How then can the harms of
private genetic testing be appraised
and minimized?
In Canada, the equitable distribu-
tion of health care resources is high
on the social agenda. Indeed, recent
debates about the introduction of
more private health care delivery have
highlighted Canadians’ continued
commitment to a public system.41
However, Canada is also a country
that puts great emphasis, particularly
in health care jurisprudence, on the
ethical principle of autonomy and the
notion of consumer choice. The ten-
sion created by these two social norms
is emphasized in the context of genet-
ic testing. 
Gatekeepers to genetic testing
One possible mechanism for regulat-
ing many genetic tests is to require
that they be accessed only through an
appropriate gatekeeper (e.g., brca1/2
testing might only be provided
through a genetics or oncology pro-
gram). The level of expertise needed
in a given gatekeeper will vary
between tests. For example, for some
tests it may be sufficient to go through
a family physician or genetic counsel-
lor, while others may require a med-
ical specialist. Finally, some tests may
be available (privately) with the assur-
ance of accurate information (e.g.,
carrier cf screening in the United
Kingdom). Whether the genetic gate-
keeper is a family physician, counsel-
lor or medical specialist, the emerging
norms around non-directive coun-
selling and informed consent would
apply. The standards of disclosure,
both ethical and legal, emphasize the
inclusion of social consequences if
they can be anticipated, as well as
health-related information.
In the commercial for-profit sector,
the discretionary assessment of gate-
keepers may be influenced by addi-
tional incentives in favour of testing.42
That is, the profit-oriented context
may create or amplify existing con-
flicts of interest. As such, it is impor-
tant to be explicit and transparent
about the possible effect of this con-
flict and, moreover, consideration
should be give to mechanisms that can
enhance gatekeeper independence.
Thoughtful guidelines, consensus
statements and professional standards
of practice, developed independently
from commercial test providers,
should help guide gatekeepers to rec-
ognize and avoid undue influence in
the profit-oriented context. Given the
low understanding which non-special-
ist providers currently have,43 a robust
education program is also needed to
enable physicians to serve this role.44
However, the rapid development of
genetic technologies will make it dif-
ficult for many gatekeepers to weigh
the benefits and harms of all new tests
effectively. Thus a regulatory regime
— or, at least, some form of over-
sight—is required that combines the
authority and expertise to evaluate the
evidence that a test accurately identi-
fies a genetic factor and that there is,
for a specific population, a net benefit.
Such a regime would need to support
of self-regulating health professionals’
efforts to exercise appropriate dis-
crimination in the gatekeeping of
genetic test access, since these profes-
sionals are likely to be the first point of
patient requests for genetic tests.
Another approach to controlling
the potential harms (to consumers)
associated with private access to
genetic tests is to justify public pay-
ment for genetic counselling. Genetic
counselling may be an effective and
economical means of addressing anx-
iety associated with the perception of
genetic risk — anxiety about health
risk is, arguably, a legitimate concern
There are significant economic and
ethical problems associated with
the co-existence of public and 
private genetic testing.
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for the health care system to address
in a cost-effective and compassionate
manner. In such circumstances it
might be reasonable to include some
partial or full support for such coun-
selling within the public system, even
if the testing of the individuals in
question is not covered. This service
should be evaluated for its effect on
utilization of genetic tests, outcomes
for individuals and economic impact.
On the other hand, it could be
argued that funding genetic coun-
selling in this manner would simply
allow the private system to unjustly
benefit from personnel and infra-
structure support from the public
health system. But assuming that the
provision of genetic counselling is
essential, and that there are limited
resources with which to provide such
services, there might nonetheless be
creative means of ensuring access to
pre- and post-test counselling. For
example, it might be possible to set up
private genetic counselling services (at
arm’s length from the genetic testing
companies), and require potential
consumers to first have counselling
before testing is permitted. Private
genetic service providers might also be
required to enter into licensing agree-
ments with existing public counselling
services to help support (both finan-
cially and with extra staff) the
increased demand for counselling that
private access will create. While such
options raise serious concerns about
equitable in access and conflict of
interest, the point is that there may be
creative ways of co-ordinating expec-
tations for counselling support with
various funding arrangements.45
More generally, if the goal is to
ensure that genetic testing is provided
in a safe, respectful and equitable man-
ner, it will be essential to engage in
open and pragmatic discussion about
the nature of genetic services and their
role in health care. This will also mean
thinking creatively about ways of
addressing the social, ethical and poli-
cy issues that arise from commercial
genetic testing. The issue of private
genetic testing is part of a larger pic-
ture; the moral and political task of
providing equitable access to health
care services and promoting health
must also be considered in the context
of reflections on “how best to bring
capital, morality, and knowledge into a
productive and ethical relationship?”46
Conclusion
Debates about public funding of genet-
ic tests are caught on the horns of a
dilemma. On the one hand, the current
clinical and population health benefits
of most forms of genetic testing seem
too limited to justify their inclusion in
health care insurance schemes that
already exclude more beneficial ser-
vices and goods (e.g., pharmaceuti-
cals). On the other hand, exclusion
from health insurance suggests that
genetic tests are consumer goods, and
may leave consumers vulnerable to
unmediated manipulation by inflated
claims designed to produce profit.
If health insurance coverage were
rational and sufficiently funded to cov-
er all health services shown on the
basis of evidence to have beneficial
health effects on individuals or popu-
lations, then genetic tests would sim-
ply need to demonstrate benefit to be
included under health insurance, and
there would be little argument for pri-
vate access. The current health care
insurance system in Canada is less
than rational and insufficiently fund-
ed to cover all effective services. Fur-
thermore, the heavy investment of
public and private funding in genom-
ic research and genetic technologies
will increase the number of candidate
technologies for evaluation, the eco-
nomic burden for financing evalua-
tion, and pressing issues about who
should bear the burden for evaluation.
At any given moment there will be
technologies and services that are
either included but under-funded, or
useful but unfunded.
It is into this complex context that
we have suggested a series of thresh-
old tests be used to determine whether
a genetic test is morally appropriate,
effective and safe, efficient and appro-
priate for public funding, and whether
private purchase poses special prob-
lems and requires further regulation.
It is our hope that this approach can
help manage some of the problems
associated with the proliferation of
genetic technologies without reducing
the pressure to assess the nature and
funding level more reasonably for the
overall health care system. Perhaps
most important, the thresholds also
identify the research questions around
which professional, public and policy
debate must be sustained: What is a
morally acceptable goal for genetic
services? What are appropriate bene-
fits? What are the risks? When is it
acceptable that services are not funded
under health care? And, how can the
harms of private access be managed?
The rapid development of genetic
technologies will make it difficult for
many gatekeepers to weigh the benefits
and harms of new tests effectively.
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